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For example, we may assume that prepay decisions are based on a "remaining-maturity" rate rather than on a single tenor. Since the majority of commonly used practical models simulate prepay speeds as the sequence of European options on the MBS current market rate, volatility selection effectively "freezes" the value of a prepay option. Perhaps, the most important point that many practitioners miss is that model selection should be studied after an option volatility matrix is matched. This leaves much less freedom to deviate from the value given by a single-factor model. What Makes the Difference? The Curve-At-Origination (CATO) prepay effect can serve a good example. If the yield curve steepens from origination, homeowners who originally elected a fixed-rate mortgage may review their choice and switch to an ARM. If the curve flattens, they will not change their selection. Hence, CATO causes an asymmetric prepayment signal in response to random twist. Another example of asymmetric pricing can be found in floater and
inverse floater IO tranches. Suppose that
x denotes
the random twist factor; without loss of generality, we can center it
on zero by interpreting x
as the deviation of the curve's slope from the historical average.
Suppose further that the positive value of x
corresponds to steepening. The value of a 1% fixed-rate IO will increase
with x due
to slower prepayments; let us write it down as a
+ bx (where b
> 0), ignoring higher-order terms. The actual floating coupon will
change with x as c + dx
where d is positive for an inverse floater and negative for a direct
floater. Hence, the total value of an IO will be (a
+ bx)(c + dx).
Let us take mathematical expectation of this expression; keeping in
mind that the expectation of x
is zero, we ultimately get Once the effect of using two-factor model is proven for IO floaters,
it can be extrapolated to some other CMO tranches having embedded IO
floating components. >>>
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