Introduction

The Andrew Davidson & Co., Inc. Fixed Rate Prepayment Model version 5.1 represents a major step forward in prepayment modeling. The model incorporates the Active-Passive Methodology for burnout as well as the enhanced pool data from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae. This model is based upon pool data from 1992 to 2005 and the enhanced data disclosure from the agencies beginning in June 2003. The initial version of the model was released in October 2005.

This article begins with a discussion of our prepayment modeling philosophy. Next, we explain the data and the existing factors in our model. We review, in detail, the various factors that drive the model and discuss a new approach to modeling the 'burnout' effect seen in prepayment modeling. We will comprehensively examine this approach, called Active-Passive Decomposition (APD), and illustrate its advantages for modeling and for valuation purposes. We will also discuss how the Agency data disclosures are incorporated into the new Enhanced Prepayment Model. Finally, we will compare prepayment model output from v5.1 to the previous version of the pool model and review valuation results using our OAS and interest rate routines and the new prepayment model.

Modeling Philosophy

Andrew Davidson & Co., Inc. (ADCo) believes that prepayment modeling at the pool level is a mixture of science and art. The key components of prepayments have been understood and modeled for some time, and a variety of statistical techniques exist to model many of the non-linear features of prepayment behavior, such as interest rate effects and housing turnover. The various factors affecting prepayments, however, tend to interact in ways in which standard statistical techniques may be ill-equipped to handle. Borrower behavior changes over time due to structural changes in the market, and new factors may influence when and why prepayments occur. For example, in our last model release, we examined how home price appreciation began to spur the 'cash-out' refinance--in which borrowers were refinancing their loans in order take advantage of the equity in their homes.1 This was a notable addition because it helped explain higher prepayments during periods when no real interest rate incentive was apparent. Furthermore, many of the forecasts that a good model will have to generate for stress-testing and OAS will be for combinations of factors that have not previously had significant impact on prepayments.

Our modeling approach emphasizes simplicity, robustness and efficiency while recognizing the importance of both historical model fit and forecasting ability. In the past, we tended to re-fit the model every 18 to 24 months and add additional factors only after determining their longevity in affecting future prepayments and gathering sufficient evidence to warrant their introduction. This latest version, rather than just a re-fit of parameters to more recent data, is a completely new model. We changed the way certain model features are implemented and introduced new characteristics that accurately capture unfamiliar borrower behavior.

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In addition to using historical data to fit model parameters, we adjusted the models to perform reasonably well across a wide-variety of stress tests and scenarios never experienced in history. As a supplement to these assessments, we evaluated the impact of changing prepayment model parameters under a variety of interest rate scenarios on valuation and risk measures such as OAS, effective duration and convexity.

**The Data**

To estimate the Fixed-Rate MBS Pool Level Prepayment Model, we used pool-level prepayment data with the following variables:

- Weighted Average Loan Age (WALA)
- Weighted average gross coupon (GWAC)
- Current Balance
- Origination year
- Origination quarter
- One-month prepayment speed

For the Enhanced Pool Level Model, we considered these additional factors:

- Average Original Loan Balance
- Weighted Average Original LTV
- Weighted Average Original Credit Score (FICO)
- % of refinanced loans in pool
- % of new purchase loans in pool
- % of single-family loans in pool
- % of multi-family loans in pool
- % of owner loans in pool
- % of second homes in pool
- % of investment properties in pool
- % geographical composition of pool

This data covers Agency pools originated in 1991 going forward to originations through the third quarter of 2005. We have monthly prepayment data for all pools through August 2005, and we used the history for additional enhanced pool data from June 2003 through December 2004.

In addition to pool performance data, we applied monthly mortgage current coupon data (the rate at which mortgages trade at par) and interest rate data (treasuries, LIBOR, etc.) from Bloomberg and home price index data provided by Mortgage Risk Assessment Corporation (MRAC). MRAC’s home price appreciation indices (HPI) is calculated using a repeat sales methodology on a monthly sales database of approximately 52 million properties.
The main factors in the fixed rate MBS pool model are turnover, refinance incentive, cash-out (home price appreciation) and credit cure. Within these factors, other effects such as aging, seasonality, spread at origination (SATO) and yield curve spread (basis point spread between the two and 10 year LIBOR rates) are used as well. We will explore why these factors are important elements of the pool-level prepayment model and then discuss the concepts of aging and burnout.

**Turnover & Seasonality**

In the absence of a refinancing incentive, one of the main drivers of prepayments is natural housing turnover. Natural housing turnover occurs for reasons like change in employment status or location, change in family size, divorce, etc. It tends to be seasonal in nature and depends on the age of the loan. For example, a greater proportion of people are inclined to move in the summer, and most people have a propensity to not sell their home within 12 months of obtaining their mortgage because of various costs involved. Turnover is heavily age dependent, and we will discuss how aging impacts prepayments shortly.

The seasonality component of turnover captures the cyclical trend in which turnover increases in the late spring and summer months and diminishes during the fall and winter months as demonstrated in Figure 1. This pattern has many causes, though weather and the school year are the standouts. People are less likely to move during the cold winter months and during the time when their children are in school.

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**Figure 1**

![Seasonality Multiplier Graph](image)
Refinance Incentive

By far, the most important factor that drives fixed-rate MBS prepayments is the level of current mortgage rates as defined by the current coupon yield plus a spread relative to the weighted-average gross coupon (GWAC) on the pool of mortgages. If a borrower has a higher interest rate than what is currently available in the market, the borrower will tend to refinance into the lower market rates, causing the prepayment speed of that pool to increase. The larger the difference between the rate held by the borrowers in the pool and the current market rate reference, the faster prepayment speeds become.

We aim to capture the change in a borrower’s monthly mortgage payments rather than just the change in mortgage rates. Within the model, we calculate an incentive that takes into account several factors:

- the GWAC of the pool
- the remaining time to maturity of the pool
- the difference between the coupon on the pool and the prevailing market coupon at the time it was originated
- the difference between the two-year and ten-year LIBOR rates

We also add a spread to the market reference rate to accurately compare it to the gross coupon. This spread is calculated by looking at the average difference between the pass-through rate and the gross rate on pools of each collateral type. For the market reference rate, we weight and sum the last three months of mortgage current coupon rates; the exact weights are based on historical data. The reason we use lagged rates is that there is a slight delay between drops in rates and increased refinancing, although this delay is shrinking over time. Five years ago, the weightings were more evenly dispersed over the three month time period, but recently we have seen a shift to the prior two months with much less weight being placed on the third month. It currently takes less time from the start of the refinance process to completion than ever before.

We examine the difference between the original GWAC and the market reference rate at origination in order to determine what we call spread at origination (SATO). In the basic pool model, we do not know the credit score (FICO) of the pool, so we use SATO as an approximation (we discuss the use of FICO in the Enhanced Model later). If this number is large, it means the pool is made up of loans that had some type of constraint that prevented them from being originated at the lower prevailing rate. This could be due to poor credit, not enough documentation or some other factor. Whatever the case, these types of pools behave differently because of this feature, so the model uses this information when determining the refinance incentive for the pool.

The Yield Curve Spread Effect

A feature added to this version of the Pool Model is the incorporation of the difference between the
2 year and 10 year LIBOR rates, termed the “Yield Curve Spread Effect.” This spread provides valuable insight as to whether refinancing out of a fixed-rate mortgage into an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) would be beneficial to the borrower. When the spread between the two rates is large, it tells us that the yield curve is steep and that the short term rate is significantly less than the long term rate. Since interest rates for ARMs are based on the short term rates, the borrower would be able to lower their monthly payment by refinancing their fixed-rate 30 year mortgage into an ARM. This provides a refinance incentive even when the GWAC of the pool and the market reference rate are nearly equal. Conversely, when the spread between the 2 year and 10 year rate is small, there is no real payment incentive for the borrower to refinance into an ARM, so the overall refinance incentive is dampened. With the explosion of the hybrid and option ARM market over the last few years, we felt the Yield Curve Spread Effect a necessary addition to the model because it helps explain why prepayment speeds change during a perceived stable mortgage rate environment.

Now that we have considered many of the characteristics that comprise refinance incentive, let’s look at an example. Figure 2 displays a sample refinancing incentive curve. As the calculated refinance incentive discussed above increases past 1.0, refinancing begins to pick up significantly and then levels off after peaking. A good way to understand this graph is to think of the portion below 1.0 as representative of loans with interest rates below the current market rate, and the portion above 1.1 to represent those with interest rates above the current market rate. The higher the incentive, the more likely prepayment will occur.

The S-shaped curve in Figure 2 is a composite based on a variety of borrowers living in different states who face different sets of financial and non-financial costs. In addition, some borrowers pay greater attention to the level of rates than others. As interest rates drop, the more aggressive refinancers tend to leave the pool first, effectively changing the shape of the curve as they exit. We will discuss how this change in the pool composition is captured when we discuss burnout later in this paper.
The Home Price (Cash-out) Effect

We introduced the Home Price Appreciation Effect into the Pool Model in 2001. In the late 1990’s and through the end of 2000, we witnessed a steady increase in the appreciation of home values over time. With equity building up in their homes, borrowers were re-financing their mortgages to take advantage of this inexpensive source of money. Through "cash-out refi," borrowers were essentially going through the refinance process in order to access the equity built up in their homes. This factor is based on a national home price appreciation index, and we look at the change in the index from a loan's origination forward for a maximum to 24 months, and from then on we look at the two year change.

Since the end of 2001, the rate of home price appreciation has increased tremendously. Slow and steady growth was seen from 1995 through 2001, as the annual two-year change went from about 10% to about 14%, and then spiked from 15% in January 2003 to a whopping 26% in June of 2005. This effect is illustrated in Figure 3. This rapid surge over such a short period of time greatly increased the impact of cash-out refinancing. A home worth $200,000 in June of 2003 increased in value to $252,000 by June of 2005: by simply refinancing the mortgage at an interest rate similar to the existing one using the new home value, a borrower could "cash-out" about $50,000. This effect has boosted prepayments especially for borrowers who have no interest-rate refinance incentive.

The Home Price Appreciation Effect has three major components, aging, an interaction with the refinancing ratio available and the magnitude of home price appreciation. Each of these components working together must be taken into account to generate accurate forecasts of the contributions to prepayments of the home price effect.

The aging effect, here, refers to the first 24 months of the loan's life, since we use a two year
change in HPI as our incentive driver. During the first 24 months in the life of a pool, the incentive is calculated using the change in the home's value since loan origination. After the 24th month, the incentive is calculated using the change from the current month and 24 months prior. For example, for a loan with an age of 48 months in February 2005, the calculated HPI incentive would be relative to February 2003. Going forward, the model's HPI forecast is, in essence, a rolling two years.

Next, borrowers are less likely to take equity out when the cost of doing so is a higher new mortgage rate. Hence, the ratio of the current loan to prevailing market rates is an important determinant of cash-out refinancing. Moreover, as that ratio becomes more favorable to the borrower, purely rate-based motives take over, and the marginal effect of home price appreciation past a certain ratio should be minimal.

**Credit Cure Effect**

The last key factor in this version of the pool-level prepayment model is what we have termed the Credit Cure Effect. As discussed in the Refinance Incentive section, borrowers sometimes have less than pristine credit and, as a result, may be forced to borrow at a rate that is measurably higher than the prevailing market rate. As these borrowers make several consecutive on-time payments, their credit will improve, making them eligible to receive a prime-based rate if they refinance. Once this happens, these borrowers will refinance their loans, creating an increase in prepayment speeds even though mortgage rates may have remained constant for a given period. To capture this effect, we look at the spread between the rate on the loan and the prevailing market rate at the time the loan was originated (SATO). The greater the spread, the greater the likelihood of a refinance occurring after credit improves.

This effect is based on both an aging component and the SATO component. As the loan age increases and there are no missed payments, the ability of the borrower to refinance increases; so the effect becomes stronger, contributing more to the overall prepayment speed. The SATO has an impact on this effect as well, with prepayment speed increasing along with the SATO.

Now that we have gone over the primary model effects (except for the vintage-based loan size effect, which will be discussed later in the paper), we'll look at how they interact with one another and how we model burnout. Our modeling of burnout is the part of the model that has changed most significantly from previous versions, and it represents the basis for all ADCo prepayment models going forward.

**Active-Passive Decomposition**

Our new approach to burnout modeling is a concept introduced by Alex Levin et al. The APD method of modeling burnout is unique in that it treats a single pool of loans as essentially two
pools — one of “active” borrowers and one of “passive” borrowers. The assumption is that the active borrowers are more sensitive to refinance opportunities and are aware of market conditions pertaining to mortgage interest rates. These borrowers are likely to prepay to take advantage of a lower interest rate, a more favorable loan type or to cash out on the equity built up in their home.

The other pool consists of the passive borrowers who are much less sensitive to refinance opportunities. The pool consisting of passive borrowers experiences prepayments mostly as a result of turnover. Passive borrowers, for whatever reason, do not respond to favorable refinance scenarios, even when they could save thousands of dollars. They do experience a small amount of refinance incentive, but not nearly as much as their active counterparts. We will discuss this in further detail later in the paper. It is this group that usually causes the burnout seen in seasoned MBS pools.

The key to APD is the ability to accurately identify the breakdown of active and passive borrowers for a given MBS pool without knowing actual pool composition, that is, without having exact characteristics of each loan in the pool. In this identification, it is important to assume no migration between the active and passive borrowers within a given pool. A borrower cannot be passive at the origination of the pool and then later become an active borrower. It is this strict classification of two distinct pools that allows the APD method to function.

**Active-Passive Decomposition Mathematics**

There are several concepts that enable APD to accurately model burnout of an MBS pool. The first notion is the breakdown of the pool into its two components as we just discussed. The key compositional variable is designated by $\Psi$, where $\Psi$ represents the percent of active borrowers in the pool, and $1 - \Psi$ represents the percent of passive borrowers in the same pool. When the pool is first created, $\Psi_0$ represents the initial percentage of active borrowers within the given pool. This $\Psi_0$ is estimated when building a prepayment model, and $\Psi_0$ can differ among collateral types. The overall prepayment speed depends on this active-passive split going forward, and $\Psi$ decreases over time as the active borrowers leave the pool.

We discussed the main prepayment model factors earlier, and now we will examine how they interact with each other to forecast prepayments. To compute the total prepayment speed in single monthly mortality rate (SMM), APD computes an SMM for the passive piece and an SMM for the active piece. Below is the calculation for the active piece with refi, turnover, cash-out and cure as components of the prepay model:

$$\text{ActiveSMM} = \text{turnoverSMM} + \text{refiSMM} + \text{cash-outSMM} + \text{cureSMM} \quad (\text{Eq. 1})$$
As mentioned in the introduction to APD, the passive piece does experience some refinance incentive, but not on the same level as the active piece. The calculation for the passive piece is as follows:

$$\text{PassiveSMM} = \text{turnoverSMM} + \beta_1 \times \text{refiSMM} + \beta_2 \times \text{cash-outSMM} + \beta_3 \times \text{cureSMM} \quad (\text{Eq. 2})$$

In this expression, the different betas represent the amount of each SMM relative to the SMMs from the active piece. These values are typically 25% or less. Also, it is important to note that the passive turnoverSMM does not have a beta associated with it because turnover is the same for both the active and passive pieces of APD, and because turnover itself is an effect that is almost independent of interest rates. The next step is to compute the total SMM for the entire pool. This is done as follows:

$$\text{TotalSMM} = \Psi \times \text{activeSMM} + (1 - \Psi) \times \text{passiveSMM} \quad (\text{Eq. 3})$$

Now that we have demonstrated how to compute the monthly SMM from the active and passive subpools, it is time to investigate how $\Psi$ decreases over time. To calculate $\Psi$ for the next month, we use the following formula, where $k$ represents the age in months of the pool:

$$\Psi_{k+1} = \Psi_k \times \left\{ \frac{(1-\text{ActiveSMM}_k)}{(1-\text{TotalSMM}_k)} \right\} \quad (\text{Eq. 4})$$

As active borrowers refinance and leave the pool, the ratio of activeSMM to totalSMM decreases and thusly $\Psi$ decreases. Tracking $\Psi$ over time is a good way to judge how burnt out a given pool is. If $\Psi$ is around 60%, the pool still has significant refinancibility. If $\Psi$ is around 15%, the pool is very burnt out, i.e. made up mostly of passive borrowers.

**Active-Passive Decomposition in Practice**

The following exhibits help illustrate how APD works. Figure 4 shows what a typical MBS pool's prepayments will be when broken down into the active and passive sub-pools. It is easy to see that the active piece's prepayment speed is heavily weighted toward the refinance component of the prepayment model, while the passive portion's prepayment speed is more equally weighted between the refinance and turnover components. Two things are important to note from Figure 4. First, turnover is the same in both the active and passive sub-pools. As discussed in the previous section, the TurnoverSMM in Eq. 2 does not have a beta scalar associated with it because turnover is a basic component of prepayments and, therefore, is a part of both the active and passive sub-pools. Second, the refinance component of the passive piece is scaled in relation to the refinance component of the active piece. If we say that turnover accounts for 8 CPR in both the active and
passive sub-pools, then we see that the 9 CPR refinance component of the passive piece is 15% of the 60 CPR refinance component of the active piece. That 15% is the value of $\beta$ from Eq. 2 from the previous section.

Figure 4 illustrates the mix of the refinance and turnover components of APD, and now we will look at a graph that demonstrates the decrease of $\Psi$ over time. The following two charts in Figure 5 represent the same MBS pool from Figure 4, but at different ages. In this example, let’s assume that the ActiveSMM (in CPR) is 68 CPR and the PassiveSMM is 17 CPR. At origination, we see that $\Psi_0$ is 80% and that active borrowers make up most of the pool. As the pool ages, active borrowers refinance and leave the pool, thereby, diminishing the impact of $\Psi$ on the overall prepayment speed. Looking at the same pool after it has aged, we can see that most active borrowers have left the pool, and only 27% of the pool is made up of active borrowers. Even though those active borrowers are prepaying at 68 CPR, the overall pool speed is only 31 CPR because the pool is more heavily weighted toward the passive borrowers.

\[
\text{Prepayment speed (0.80*68 + 0.20*17) = 58}
\]

\[
\text{Prepayment speed (0.27*68 + 0.73*17) = 31}
\]
Now that we have discussed the mathematics behind APD, let’s look at how it works in different mortgage rate scenarios. We established that $\Psi$ decreases over time as active borrowers leave the pool. Figure 6 illustrates how quickly $\Psi$ diminishes over a short time in a high refinance / low mortgage rate scenario. As the amount of outstanding balance drops over 60 months, it is evident how the composition of a pool changes. At month 0, the pool’s balance is comprised of 80% active borrowers and 20% passive borrowers. By month 36, that mix has changed to about 50% of both active and passive borrowers, and, as a result, the overall prepayment speed has dropped by about 10 CPR. At month 60, we can definitely say that this pool is burnt out, as it is made up of mostly passive borrowers.

In the opposite scenario, a low refinance / high mortgage rate environment, we can see (in Figure 7) how a pool with very little refinance incentive behaves. The balance decreases over time are now just the monthly mortgage payments being made with the basic turnover component. Notice how both the active and passive pieces experience similar balance decreases. This shows how turnover affects both groups in the same manner. The CPR stays relatively constant, and $\Psi$ decreases by less than 10%.
The APD model naturally simulates the burnout and other prepayment effects, such as incentive-dependent speed ramping or "catch-up" for prepay-penalty pools. We feel that this is an improvement over previous methods of capturing burnout, not only because of model accuracy but because it opens doors to new valuation and modeling tasks in combination with new enhanced agency data disclosures. We will explore this further in the next section.

**Enhanced Agency Data**

**Introduction to Enhanced Agency Pool Data**

In June 2003, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began to release more pool-level data, which they referred to as the enhanced data disclosures. This additional data can be used to estimate more accurate prepayment models, and it allows analysts to value specific pools versus TBA's, in which the only information available is the mortgage coupon, weighted average loan age (WALA) and collateral type. We will examine these new data fields and explain why each is important to prepay modeling.

**Enhanced Data**

Six different data elements were made available in June 2003:
- Weighted-Average Original LTV
- Weighted Average Original FICO Score
- Loan Purpose
- Occupancy Type
- Property Type
These data elements plus Weighted-Average Original Loan Balance and Geographical Distribution, which have been provided for some time, are given for each pool Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have issued for all collateral types.

Weighted-Average Original Loan Balance is the amount, in dollars, of the total original pool balance divided by the number of loans in the pool. Weighted-Average Original LTV represents the average loan-to-value ratio for the entire pool at origination. Loan-to-value is the ratio of the mortgage amount to the actual value of the house. Weighted-Average Original FICO Score is the average credit score of the entire pool at origination. Both Weighted-Average Original LTV and Weighted-Average Original FICO score are balance-weighted values based on individual loan sizes in the pool.

The next four data elements contain categories, unlike the three we just described, that are represented with one number. Loan Purpose contains two categories: Purchase or Refinance; referring to whether the loan was for a new home purchase or a refinance of an existing mortgage. It is reported using the amount of pool balance in each category, and the total number in each will sum to the total pool balance. Occupancy Type has three categories: Owner, Second Home or Investment Property. These are also reported using pool balance, and all three categories will sum to the total balance of the pool. Property Type contains two categories: Single Family or 2 to 4 Family; referring to the type of housing unit the loan represents. Like the previous two data elements, it also is reported in pool balance and sums to the original balance of the pool. Finally, we have the Geographic Distribution of each pool, which tells what amount of balance from the pool is comprised of loans from different states. Adding up each state's balance will give you the original balance of the pool. Loan Servicer disclosure is not included in our modeling effort because we prefer to utilize measures that relate directly to the underlying loan.

It is helpful to examine these seven data elements in two groups. Weighted-Average Original Loan Balance (WAOLB), Weighted-Average Original FICO (FICO), and Weighted-Average Original LTV (WAOLTV) all fall into the same group, because they are reported as single discrete values, for example $155,000 for WAOLB, 720 for FICO, and 80% for WAOLTV. The other three; Occupancy Type, Property Type and Geographical Distribution fall into the same group because they are categorical and are best represented as percents of original balance. For example, Loan Purpose has two categories; Purchase or Refinance. These are best expressed in the manner of 90% Purchase, 10% Refinance for a given pool. The same method applies to the other three elements in this group. Since these will all sum to 100%, we may use the data in this form for prepayment model estimation. Let's take a look at some of the balance distributions for these new data elements.

**Characteristics of Enhanced Data**

We will look at the data for all Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 30-year pools from June 2003 to December 2004 to get an idea of what an "average" pool might look like. We broke down WAOLB, FICO, and
WAOLTV into different buckets and examined the balance distribution in each. To produce the following graphs, we examined what the overall outstanding balance was for pools that fell into each of the classes and then calculated the percentage of each class relative to the overall outstanding balance of the dataset. Figure 8 shows the breakdown for WAOLB.

![Figure 8: Average Original Loan Balance](image)

Here we can see that the largest percent of balance falls in the $125,000 to $150,000 class. This appears to be an approximately normal distribution with steady slopes outward from the midpoint. Moving to FICO, Figure 9 displays the distribution among the different FICO classes.

![Figure 9: Average Original FICO](image)
We see the same general distribution as in the previous graph, but with a definite skew to the right, and with the 710 to 730 FICO class containing the largest percentage of original balance. Only about 8% of the balance falls below 690, as it becomes increasingly difficult to securitize a loan through Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac for FICO scores below this level. Lastly, the graph of Original LTV distribution in Figure 10 is also slightly skewed.

In Figure 10 we can see that the largest amount of balance is concentrated in the 70% to 75% LTV range. What is most interesting about this graph, however, is that there appear to be an additional peak in the distribution lying in the 55%-65% range. This emergence of two peaks occurs because the data set contains two important subsets of data; new purchase loans and refinanced loans (as discussed previously). When we break down these two subsets further, the refinanced loan data has the peak in the 55%-65% range, and the new purchase loans have the peak in the 70%-75% range. Also, as expected, few loans are above 90% LTV, as most high LTV borrowers who would fall into this category go through GNMA.

Now we’ll look at the other four data elements to examine where the most balance lies among the different categories. For Loan Purpose, the majority of the balance lies in the Refinance category, but the breakdown shows that the two groups are relatively close -- 59% for Refinance and 41% for Purchase. Given that the time period covered here contains a good amount of data from the big refinance wave that happened in the summer of 2003, and the fact that rates have remained at lower levels compared to historical values, the numbers may be a little skewed toward the Refinance category than might have been seen in the past.
Next is Occupancy Type, and the dispersion among the three categories is somewhat predictable since Owner dominates this group with 91% because most mortgages in the U.S. are for family residences. Second Homes are usually vacation homes and are popular in certain parts of the country, but only for the moderately wealthy, as shown in the 3% that it makes up. Finally, we have Investment Properties with 6% of overall balance. The number for Investment Properties has grown over the years, showing that more people are using the real estate market as an investment tool because of attractive mortgage rates and steep home price appreciation.

Looking at Property Type, we would expect Single Family to comprise almost all the balance, and that is indeed the case as Single Family homes make up 96% of the balance and 2 to 4 Family units comprise only 4%. The Geographical Distribution is also an important variable to examine because it gives us insight into which states dominate the mortgage market. The state with the largest amount of loan balance at 17% is California, and that is really no surprise since it is one of the largest states in the U.S. and the most heavily populated. One of the factors that makes California such a high percentage is that not only are there millions of people who have mortgages, but the values of those mortgages are very high since California has the highest average home price in the country. The next four states behind California are Florida at 6% and then New York, Texas and Illinois all in the 4% range. It might seem strange that New York doesn’t make up a higher percentage, but New York City (specifically Manhattan), where most of the state’s population is concentrated, doesn’t have homes but rather apartments. Most people in Manhattan rent, therefore, the population numbers are not reflected in the mortgage balances.

Enhanced Data and Prepayments

It has been shown in non-agency loans that all of these different factors influence prepayments. Non-agency loan-level prepayment models often use inputs like loan balance and LTV to predict prepayments. Now that the agencies are disclosing this information as well, we can use expanded modeling concepts to use this data in forecasting.

Over time, we observe that the higher the original loan balance, the more likely a prepayment will occur. Higher prepayment speeds on high loan balance loans reflect two main effects. First, loan refinancing is subject to a variety of fixed costs. With larger loan balances, those fixed costs decrease as a percent of the overall dollar savings associated with a given amount of rate decrease. Second, borrowers with high loan balances are likely to be more affluent and consequently may have greater financial flexibility and the financial savvy to take advantage of refinance opportunities.

We also observe that the higher the LTV, the less likely a prepayment will occur. LTV measures the amount of the loan to the overall price of the home. The higher the LTV, the more the loan is paying for the house, meaning that the borrower did not have the ability to put a substantial down payment
on the home and had to finance more of it. This gives us insight into the borrower's financial state and, therefore, helps us determine the loan's refinancibility. Since the borrower with a high LTV had to finance most of the cost of their home, they would less likely be able to afford the costs of refinancing. Credit score is a much more straightforward variable: the higher a borrower's FICO score; the higher the propensity of that borrower to refinance given the opportunity and the lower the FICO; the lower the propensity to refinance.

What about the other four variables? Loan Purpose is important because it gives us the mix of new purchase loans and loans that are refinances. On average, once a borrower has refinanced, they are less likely to do so again. The agency disclosures do not split out cash-out refinancing from non-cash-out refinancing. It is probable that non-cash out refinancers continue to have a high propensity to prepay. For both Occupancy Type and Property Type, one category in each dominates the overall balance (Owner and Single Family, respectively). In this case, if an analyst knows that a given pool has a larger amount of Investment Properties or 2 to 4 Family loans, for example, they know that the prepayment behavior will be different from an average pool and can value the pool properly.

**Enhanced Data and APD Prepayment Modeling**

Now that we have discussed the APD method in the pool-level prepayment model and how the new Enhanced Data disclosures can affect prepayments, we will explore how they come together within the Enhanced Prepayment Model. The approach we will use demonstrates how the new data works in combination with a pool-level prepayment model, rather than building a pool-level prepayment model that uses these factors directly.

The formulas Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 discussed earlier comprise the ActiveSMM and PassiveSMM pieces of the prepayment model. These formulas contain the model components that drive prepayments for this particular model. We discussed earlier that the two biggest drivers of prepayments are the turnover and refinance pieces. We use the enhanced data to develop multipliers for each of these components. In our enhanced data model, we incorporate the impact of the enhanced data elements on these two components of prepayment.

Suppose we have a pool that has a WAOLB of $165,000. Our model has estimated that pools with WAOLBs of $165,000 should have a RefiSMM of 106% of the "average" loan and a TurnoverSMM at 93% of the average loan. This means that if the RefiSMM and TurnoverSMM output by the pool model are 0.44 and 0.028, respectively, for a given pool, then the new values computed using the multipliers for that pool will be 0.44 * 1.06 = 0.4664 for RefiSMM, and 0.028 * 0.93 = 0.02604 for TurnoverSMM. This additional knowledge of the WAOLB gives us the ability to more accurately forecast an SMM for that specific pool when compared to the pool model by itself. This same method applies for both WAOLTV and FICO.
When analyzing the other variables, Loan Purpose, Property Type and Occupancy Type, we treat the dominant categories, like Owner, Single Family and Purchase (we use Purchase even though Refinance has slightly more balance because we feel that the data was skewed by the refinance wave in the summer of 2003) as the 1.0 average groups, and multipliers are estimated for the smaller categories, like Second Home, Investment Property, 2 to 4 Family and Refinance. These are computed slightly differently from WAOLB, WAOLTV and FICO in the sense that the multipliers are factored directly into the percentage of loans those categories contain. Here, multipliers are obtained using whatever the model estimates for the categories are, in this case -0.1637 for Second Home, and multiplying it by the corresponding percentage of Second Homes in a given pool. For example, if a pool is made up of 13% Second Home loans, then the resulting multiplier will be -0.1637 x 0.13 = -0.021281. We then use the exponential function to obtain the final value of e^{-0.021281} = 94.9%. This number is multiplied to the pool's originally forecasted RefiSMM to determine the specific forecast for the pool. The same method is applied to the pool's TurnoverSMM: in this case the estimated value for Second Homes is -0.65, which then calculates to e^{-0.65 x 0.13} = 91.9%. By looking at the values of the multipliers, we can see the effect that these enhanced data elements have on the prepayment model estimates for different pools. In this example, the more Second Home loans that are in a given pool of loans, the slower the overall prepayments are for that pool.

Lastly, we look at geographical distribution. The method for this data is very much the same as the previous section on the percentage variables. Here, all states are modeled together to obtain multipliers for each. California acts almost as the average class for the refinance multiplier, and since it so dominates the balance, its estimate comes out to 0.000167, which equates to e^{0.000167} = 101.7%. It is the closest of all states to 100% in the refinance multipliers. Let's say a certain pool is comprised of 25% Illinois loans and 75% Ohio loans. The multiplier for RefiSMM would be e^{(0.75 x 0.001277 + 0.25 x 0.00087) x100} = 110%. In this case, the numbers are multiplied by 100 in the exponent for scaling purposes. This example shows us that a pool made up of Ohio and Illinois loans will have a faster prepayment forecast than the average pool in which the geographic distribution is not known. Also, geographical distribution is used when calculating HPI, which is used in computing the CashoutSMM for a given pool. A weighted-average HPI of the states in the pool is applied instead of the national HPI, providing a pool-specific CashoutSMM.

In the few examples we observed, we saw how different classes produced different multipliers for RefiSMM and TurnoverSMM. Figures 11 though 18 illustrate how the multipliers for the different variables behave for the turnover and refinance components. Remember there are no multipliers for the Owner, Purchase, and Single Family categories because they are considered the average categories. Also, Figures 14 through 18 show what the multiplier effects would be for different percentages of each data element, since the multiplier is calculated based on the percentage.
Figure 14
Refinance

Figure 15
Investment Property

Figure 16
Second Homes
What overall trends do we recognize from the previous charts? One main effect is that a lower original loan balance leads to lower prepayments, and a higher loan balance leads to a higher prepayment for loans with a refinance incentive. Also, a lower LTV leads to higher turnover, but less refinancing. This could be due to a variety of reasons, like lower LTV loans having favorable interest rates. Looking at FICO, it's interesting to note that relative to the 730-750 class, as FICO decreases, turnover increases. When looking at the datasets, we see that in the Discount dataset that 72% of the balance lies above a FICO of 730. We also see that as the percentage of both Second Homes and Multifamily properties increases, the overall prepayment speed decreases. Finally, pools made up of mostly NY loans will have slower than average prepayment speeds, while those made up of mostly CA loans will be faster.

The APD framework is advantageous for modeling prepayments in this fashion. Since burnout is endogenous to the model, the rate of burnout naturally adjusts for changes in the relative speeds of the TurnoverSMM and the RefiSMM. A parametric model of burnout would need to be adjusted to reflect these changes.
After initially estimating the Pool-Level Prepayment Model, we noticed that the model was consistently overstating prepayments for loans originated from 1992-1998. Further analysis revealed that the prepayment model was slightly biased towards more recent data because more loans from the past 3-4 years are in the dataset compared to loans originated 7-10 years ago. This is not a flaw in the data, but rather a natural result of prepayments occurring over time. Since the average loan size has been increasing over time, especially within the last few years, we realized the best way to slow down prepayments for older vintages was to use the results of our enhanced data multipliers to scale prepayment forecasts for pools based on their time of origination using a data file of historical average loan sizes over time. For example, for a pool originated in November 1995, the average size of a FNMA loan originated at that time was about $105,000. Using this value, we apply the multiplier corresponding to this WAOLB and scale the RefiSMM and TurnoverSMM accordingly. Since the graphs from the previous section show that the multipliers decrease as loan size decreases, this is an effective way to slow down prepayment forecasts for older vintages. This effect is implemented in the pool level model and is disabled when enhanced data is used, so that the true WAOLB is used instead of the approximated historical value.

Enhanced vs. Pool Model

To see the effects of the Enhanced Model in practice, we ran an analysis using the same inputs in both the Pool Model and the Enhanced Model, but with the addition of WAOLB, WAOLTV, FICO and geographical breakdown for the Enhanced Model. For this particular example, we analyzed a FNMA 30-year pool with an age of 1 month and a pool WAC of 6.0. We started the analysis in January 2004 and forecast 25 months of prepayment speeds using known mortgage rates. For the enhanced data we used a WAOLB of $65,000, a WAOLTV of 68%, a FICO of 740, and made the geographical breakdown to be 100% NY loans. Figure 19 displays the forecasts for both the Pool Model and the Enhanced Model.
As we can see, the incorporation of the additional enhanced data factors greatly influences the prepayment forecast. For this example, we chose inputs determined to have a dampening effect in order to display the strength of the multipliers of the Enhanced Model. It is possible that given different characteristics of a pool the various multipliers will almost cancel each other out. Also, if any characteristics are left blank, they will be set to 100%.

**Comparison of v4.3.4 and v5.1 Pool models**

On the Pool Model level, there are several major differences between the ADCo Pool Level Prepayment Model (v4.3.4) and the Enhanced Prepayment Model (v5.1). A quick recap:

1. **Burnout**: The previous method for modeling burnout has been replaced with the new Active-Passive Decomposition method. This is a more natural form of capturing the burnout of a given pool, using that pool's heterogeneity as the driver of burnout.

2. **Yield Curve Spread Effect**: Using the two and ten year LIBOR rates, we calculate additional or lessened refinance incentive based on the spread between the two rates. This gives a proxy as to how favorable it may be to refinance into an ARM depending on whether the yield curve is steep or flat.

3. **Vintage-based Loan Size Effect**: Given that loan sizes have been increasing over time, we use this effect to dampen prepayment speeds for older collateral, since a prepayment model estimated in today's marketplace is biased towards the higher loan balances of the past few years. This factor is directly derived from the enhanced data multipliers.

We'll now look at comparisons between version 4.3.4 and version 5.1 to get an idea of the differences between them. In both cases, we are looking at the pool-level models only. First, Figure 20 shows both models' historical fit for a FNMA 30-year 6.5 originated in 2001. As we can see, version 5.1 pool model does a better job at reaching peak speeds and has an overall average model error of 2.9 CPR compared to 5.0 CPR for version 4.3.4.
Now we'll take a look at some valuation results in Figure 21 using both 4.3.4 and 5.1 Pool Level Models. The inputs here (price, WAM and servicing) are market data obtained from Bloomberg on February 3, 2006. We use the ADCo OAS v5.2 for prepayment model version 4.3.4 and OAS v6.0 for prepayment model version 5.1, with the same rate and volatility assumptions for both.

Here, it is apparent that durations have shortened across the board and that WALs are less for the discounts, slightly more around par and less for the premiums. This reflects the change in the way burnout is modeled, along with the other improvements made to the model.

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Here, it is apparent that durations have shortened across the board and that WALs are less for the discounts, slightly more around par and less for the premiums. This reflects the change in the way burnout is modeled, along with the other improvements made to the model.

**Conclusion**

This release of the Andrew Davidson & Co., Inc. Fixed Rate Agency MBS Pool-Level Prepayment Model and Enhanced Prepayment Model mark a new modeling approach compared to previous model versions. The overall structure of the model has been changed, and a new layer of detail has been added to pool model prepayment forecasting thanks to the new enhanced data elements now provided by the agencies. The combination of the new model features, the applied APD method of burnout modeling and the ability to consider enhanced data elements gives this version of the Andrew Davidson & Co., Inc. Fixed-Rate Agency MBS Prepayment Model a great amount of power in forecasting prepayments.


**Author Biography**

Dan Szakallas is responsible for the research and development of the company's suite of Agency pool-level prepayment models for both fixed rate and ARM collateral using data from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. He has worked extensively in incorporating the Active-Passive Decomposition mortgage model as well many other factors into the proprietary models developed at Andrew Davidson & Co., Inc. He also provides custom model tuning analysis to clients using their portfolio data and monitors model performance using the dynamic performance reports available at the Andrew Davidson & Co., Inc. website www.ad-co.com.

In addition, Dan has co-authored several of Andrew Davidson & Co., Inc.'s *Quantitative Perspectives*, has had an article published in the *Journal of Fixed Income*, and regularly contributes his model performance analysis to the company's monthly newsletter, *The Pipeline*.

He graduated from Carnegie Mellon University with a dual major in Statistics and Psychology.