The S-Curve

Welcome to The S-Curve

Now you will be able to receive the latest announcements, product updates, and our insights on the mortgage market in real time.

The name of the blog, the S-Curve, is a reflection of our logo and the central feature of our prepayment model. S-curves are seen in nature in many phenomenon, from population growth to prepayment and default models. Our first S-curve, in the early 1990s, used the arctangent function, then piece-wise linear functions, and evolved over time to be more complex and vary by FICO, loan size and LTV. This evolution encapsulates both the timeless nature of fundamental relationships and constant innovation to describe them better over time.

We hope you find the information useful and we look forward to your feedback.

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Blog - Latest
  • On the Road Away from LIBOR

    Alex Levin

    Products

    The release of Andrew Davidson & Co., Inc.’s (AD&Co) new generation of financial engineering tools marks a shift to a new reality; when the traditional benchmark for MBS valuation, the LIBOR/ Swap yield curve, becomes unavailable. Our recent Product Release email informed our readers about the change. In short, our users can:

    • Conduct valuation relative to one of three benchmark rate curves: Treasury, LIBOR or SOFR.
    • Provide either an absolute rate volatility matrix or the traditional relative volatility matrix.
    • Apply a negative shift (floor) to otherwise positive-rate models (Squared Gaussian or Black-Karasinski).

    The 3-benchmark valuation option provides analytical flexibility within the transitional period of LIBOR availability and well beyond; hence, this is both a "transitional" and "permanent" solution. Regardless of the benchmark chosen, SOFR-indexed ARMs and CMO/CRT floaters will use a SOFR term structure of rates (if provided) for the index projection. If a SOFR term structure isn’t provided, we will project SOFR indices off the chosen benchmark plus the initial spread.

    The absolute volatility quotation has grown as a popular format. It represents the best practical choice when a valuation benchmark (e.g. Treasury) is different from a volatility source (e.g. options of SOFR swaps).

    Which yield-curve benchmark should practitioners use for valuation? About 30-40 years ago, MBS were priced off Treasury bonds, a close investment alternative. However, Treasury rates have never been borrowing rates; this honor belonged to the LIBOR market. A pricing spread to a borrowing curve can be easily translated into return on equity (given the leverage) and, unsurprisingly, the LIBOR/Swap curve became the dominant benchmark.

    With the upcoming demise of LIBOR, the current market trend suggests a return to Treasuries. Most dealers now report exclusively Treasury OAS on TBAs. The Security Finance Association (SFA) established a task force that recommended one of the Treasury-based spreads. The so-called I-curve (interpolated-WAL curve) was voted the best quotation option according to the SFA by “a supermajority of investors, traders and syndicate desks…across all structured finance products” whereas “issuers and bankers are split on the benchmark they favor with a slight majority preferring a Treasury-based curve over the SOFR swap curve.” To reiterate, our tools are ready for a change in prevailing practice.

    What about the preferred source of volatility? With the Treasury curve returning to the benchmark role, which market volatility would we recommend of using? The only Treasury-related options – options on Treasury futures – represent a thin layer of information, which, at best can be interpreted as volatility on long bonds. While they may help decipher the value of the embedded prepayment option, they are less relevant to caps and floors found in CMO/CRT floaters and ARMs. It is also impossible to calibrate the mean reversion parameter of a term structure model without observing volatility quotes on differing tenors.

    Our recommendation, which may be unexpected at a first glance, is to consider options on SOFR-based swaps that have developed in a way similar to LIBOR-based swaps. Since Treasury rates differ from SOFR-swap rates, we recommend using absolute (aka “normal”), rather than traditional relative (aka “lognormal” or Black), volatility inputs. Essentially, we posit that, given a tenor, various US rate benchmarks tend to exhibit similar volatilities. Our review of the SOFR/Swap volatility and LIBOR/Swap volatility confirms this assumption – despite the difference in rate’s levels.

    Are we changing the Current-Coupon Yield (CCY) model? The existing CCY model is a linear regression calibrated to a multi-year historical movements against the 2-year and the 10-year points of either Treasury or swap rates. The SOFR term rates are relatively short in history and at the point of writing, there is no immediate reason to change the model’s coefficients when the SOFR curve is chosen as a benchmark. Going forward, this statement merits a review; the entire approach to projecting CCY from benchmark rates may also need to be reassessed.

    Are we changing the LoanDynamics Model (LDM) at all? Borrower behavior for SOFR-indexed ARMs is likely to be unaffected by the index’s name, as long as we control for the current and projected loan rate. At this time, we have no history of SOFR-ARM prepayments or defaults that warrants any revisions of LDM.

Blog - Archives

The S-Curve Archives

  • Richard Cooperstein

    Thoughts

    Summary

    In 2021, Andrew Davidson & Co. Inc. (AD&Co) proposed a benchmark cohort approach to setting Ability-to-Repay (ATR) Qualified Mortgages (QM) standards. Successful benchmarks based on data are model-free and transparent, and the cohorts must perform consistently in comparison to one another and across time. Our original work used data through the early stages of the pandemic when non-performing loan percentages skyrocketed.

  • Richard Cooperstein

    Thoughts

    How Lowering Capital Costs Affects Higher-Risk Loans

    Government-sponsored enterprises (or GSEs) are companies that provide guarantees and financing to originators through the mortgage secondary market. The size and resilience of the GSE secondary market maximizes diversification and liquidity which reduces financial risk and cost of capital. This benefit accrues to conforming borrowers through lower mortgage rates and resiliently available financing. 

  • Alex Levin

    Products

    The release of Andrew Davidson & Co., Inc.’s (AD&Co) new generation of financial engineering tools marks a shift to a new reality; when the traditional benchmark for MBS valuation, the LIBOR/ Swap yield curve, becomes unavailable. Our recent Product Release email informed our readers about the change. In short, our users can:

  • Richard Cooperstein

    Thoughts

    FHFA held a listening session for interested parties on its proposed rule on the GSE process for credit scores.  The objective is making mortgage underwriting and pricing more accurate and more fair while balancing practical implementation by firms in the mortgage ecosystem.  Along with many others, I had the opportunity to provide insights on this proposed rulemaking.

  • Andrew Davidson

    Thoughts

    In our January 19th blog entitled, A More Equitable Lending System Will Not Be Created by Accident, we described the efforts it will take to overcome not just bias in lending today, but the systemic factors that have limited access to credit in the past and have created an unjust system. 

  • Eknath Belbase

    Thoughts

    In this short blog post I discuss some developments taking place in the flood insurance landscape in the US and look ahead at a few potential directions things could go. I suggest that universal catastrophic flood insurance coverage with a continuation of the introduction of risk-based pricing would be a significant improvement.

  • Richard Cooperstein

    Thoughts

    Introduction

    The Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) entered conservatorship in September 2008. One could view the succeeding thirteen years as a journey back to financial stability with a refined operating model that looks more like a financial utility than a hedge fund. This business model is more compatible with a fair lending mission for a standard-setter that maintains secondary markets under an effective regulator. The GSEs remain the largest part of the housing finance backbone and a resilient funding source during economic stress.

  • Andrew Davidson

    Thoughts

    Around 75% of white American families were homeowners in the first quarter of 2020, according to data from the United States Census Bureau. However, only 44% of Black American families owned their homes at the same time.

  • Eknath Belbase

    Thoughts

    According to a report by the Research Institute for Housing America, climate change risk is rapidly increasing in the housing industry and will continue to demand more attention and regulation in the near future.

  • Mickey Storms, Richard Cooperstein

    Thoughts

    Mortgage market participants are keenly aware that the Federal Reserve has been scaling back its UST and MBS purchases and factoring the outcomes of its actions on stakeholders across markets.