Welcome to The S-Curve
Now you will be able to receive the latest announcements, product updates, and our insights on the mortgage market in real time.
The name of the blog, the S-Curve, is a reflection of our logo and the central feature of our prepayment model. S-curves are seen in nature in many phenomenon, from population growth to prepayment and default models. Our first S-curve, in the early 1990s, used the arctangent function, then piece-wise linear functions, and evolved over time to be more complex and vary by FICO, loan size and LTV. This evolution encapsulates both the timeless nature of fundamental relationships and constant innovation to describe them better over time.
We hope you find the information useful and we look forward to your feedback.
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On the Road Away from LIBORProductsThe release of Andrew Davidson & Co., Inc.’s (AD&Co) new generation of financial engineering tools marks a shift to a new reality; when the traditional benchmark for MBS valuation, the LIBOR/ Swap yield curve, becomes unavailable. Our recent Product Release email informed our readers about the change. In short, our users can:
- Conduct valuation relative to one of three benchmark rate curves: Treasury, LIBOR or SOFR.
- Provide either an absolute rate volatility matrix or the traditional relative volatility matrix.
- Apply a negative shift (floor) to otherwise positive-rate models (Squared Gaussian or Black-Karasinski).
The 3-benchmark valuation option provides analytical flexibility within the transitional period of LIBOR availability and well beyond; hence, this is both a "transitional" and "permanent" solution. Regardless of the benchmark chosen, SOFR-indexed ARMs and CMO/CRT floaters will use a SOFR term structure of rates (if provided) for the index projection. If a SOFR term structure isn’t provided, we will project SOFR indices off the chosen benchmark plus the initial spread.
The absolute volatility quotation has grown as a popular format. It represents the best practical choice when a valuation benchmark (e.g. Treasury) is different from a volatility source (e.g. options of SOFR swaps).
Which yield-curve benchmark should practitioners use for valuation? About 30-40 years ago, MBS were priced off Treasury bonds, a close investment alternative. However, Treasury rates have never been borrowing rates; this honor belonged to the LIBOR market. A pricing spread to a borrowing curve can be easily translated into return on equity (given the leverage) and, unsurprisingly, the LIBOR/Swap curve became the dominant benchmark.
With the upcoming demise of LIBOR, the current market trend suggests a return to Treasuries. Most dealers now report exclusively Treasury OAS on TBAs. The Security Finance Association (SFA) established a task force that recommended one of the Treasury-based spreads. The so-called I-curve (interpolated-WAL curve) was voted the best quotation option according to the SFA by “a supermajority of investors, traders and syndicate desks…across all structured finance products” whereas “issuers and bankers are split on the benchmark they favor with a slight majority preferring a Treasury-based curve over the SOFR swap curve.” To reiterate, our tools are ready for a change in prevailing practice.
What about the preferred source of volatility? With the Treasury curve returning to the benchmark role, which market volatility would we recommend of using? The only Treasury-related options – options on Treasury futures – represent a thin layer of information, which, at best can be interpreted as volatility on long bonds. While they may help decipher the value of the embedded prepayment option, they are less relevant to caps and floors found in CMO/CRT floaters and ARMs. It is also impossible to calibrate the mean reversion parameter of a term structure model without observing volatility quotes on differing tenors.
Our recommendation, which may be unexpected at a first glance, is to consider options on SOFR-based swaps that have developed in a way similar to LIBOR-based swaps. Since Treasury rates differ from SOFR-swap rates, we recommend using absolute (aka “normal”), rather than traditional relative (aka “lognormal” or Black), volatility inputs. Essentially, we posit that, given a tenor, various US rate benchmarks tend to exhibit similar volatilities. Our review of the SOFR/Swap volatility and LIBOR/Swap volatility confirms this assumption – despite the difference in rate’s levels.
Are we changing the Current-Coupon Yield (CCY) model? The existing CCY model is a linear regression calibrated to a multi-year historical movements against the 2-year and the 10-year points of either Treasury or swap rates. The SOFR term rates are relatively short in history and at the point of writing, there is no immediate reason to change the model’s coefficients when the SOFR curve is chosen as a benchmark. Going forward, this statement merits a review; the entire approach to projecting CCY from benchmark rates may also need to be reassessed.
Are we changing the LoanDynamics Model (LDM) at all? Borrower behavior for SOFR-indexed ARMs is likely to be unaffected by the index’s name, as long as we control for the current and projected loan rate. At this time, we have no history of SOFR-ARM prepayments or defaults that warrants any revisions of LDM.
The S-Curve Archives
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ThoughtsRecently, aggregators have crossed market borders by issuing residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) backed by owner-occupied (OO), GSE-eligible conforming loans. Additionally, conforming mortgage loans have drawn investment interest from insurance companies fronted by aggregators and evaluated by third-party firms. These developments constitute historically rare disintermediations of the nearly monopsonist purchases of conforming loans by the GSEs.
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PodcastJoin Rob Landauer in a conversation with Abe Martin as they discuss his recent Pipeline article, "Modeling the Balance Behavior of HELOC Borrowers." In this episode, they highlight key points from the article as he shares insights into the draw component of HELOCs and provide an update on the beta rele
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News
We’re excited to announce a major addition to the Andrew Davidson & Co., Inc. (AD&Co) team. Industry leaders Kelli Sayres and Gene Park, known for building and scaling leading fixed-income analytics platforms, have joined AD&Co’s Business Development team.
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ThoughtsBuilding on our earlier research on expanded consumer attributes, AD&Co continues to explore how credit data contributes to modeling delinquency and prepayment risk, which are key drivers of mortgage servicing rights cash flows and valuation.
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EventsAndrew Davidson recently joined NFM Lending’s Greg Sher on the One On One podcast to discuss our recent white paper, “The Impact of Moving Away From the Tri-Merge Standard.”
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EventsAD&Co recently sponsored and attended SFVegas 2026 and Optimal Blue Summit 2026. This post shares the AD&Co team's unique perspectives and key takeaways from attending both conferences.
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NewsAD&Co US Mortgage High Yield Indices
The Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) portal, housed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, has been publishing AD&Co’s CRT indices since 2019. These series posted under the overall name of “US Mortgage High-Yield” include total return rates and credit and option-adjusted spreads (crOAS) – a projected return’s spread over Treasury (in the past, Libor). These series are available going back to 2014-end and tiered by CRT initial supports.
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ThoughtsIn July 2025, the US Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) announced that the government-sponsored entities (the Enterprises or GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, would permit lenders to choose between Classic FICO and VantageScore 4.0 credit score models for loans sold to the GSEs. FHFA also stated in a social media post that the tri-merge standard would be maintained for mortgage underwriting. Nevertheless, some mortgage industry stakeholders recommend moving away from the tri-merge standard for GSE mortgages in favor of a single or bi-merge report standard.
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News
As housing faces more climate threats that result in more losses, the insurance program that it sits on is teetering on the brink of collapse. Yet, the home insurance market has three distinct stakeholders that have competing priorities, and today, there is no motivation for a collaborative solution.
Understanding how to strengthen and protect the current structure requires looking at the cost burdens along with the risk for each of those parties.
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ThoughtsThere has been a flurry of activity in the mortgage markets since the 2018 passage of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act. This act requires the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA, now known as US Federal Housing) to validate and modernize the credit score models used in the housing finance system. It should be noted that so far, the discourse has been around mortgages sold to the Enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Ginnie Mae has not provided any guidance on their plans to start using new credit score models.